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Optimal Simple Monetary and Fiscal Rules under
Limited Asset Market Participation
The combination of limited asset market participation and consumption
habits generates indeterminacy for empirically plausible calibrations of a
business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities.
Equilibrium determinacy is restored by demand management policies based
on simple fiscal rules. In this regard, fiscal control of nominal income growth
is particularly effective. In addition the complementarity between the Taylor
rule and the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth produces relatively
large welfare gains, limiting both aggregate and intragroup volatilities.
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THE STANDARD NEW KEYNESIAN framework is characterized by
optimizing agents and by a number of nominal and real frictions in goods, labor, and
financial markets. Following a seminal contribution by Mankiw (2000), a second
strand of New Keynesian literature emphasizes the role of rule-of-thumb (henceforth
RT) consumers who do not participate to financial markets and therefore cannot
save or borrow. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) in their Sigma model calibrate
the share of RT consumers at 50% in order to replicate the dynamic performance
of the Federal Reserve Board Global Model. Galı`, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007)
as well as Furlanetto and Seneca (2009) show that RT consumers can rationalize
the empirically observed response of aggregate consumption to public spending
shocks. In Furlanetto and Seneca (2011), the RT hypothesis helps to account for
recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks. Andre´s et al. (2008) show that
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nominal rigidities and RT consumers can rationalize the empirically observed negative
correlation between government size and consumption volatility in OECD countries.
In Bosca` et al. (2009), the combination of RT consumers and consumption habits
significantly improves the ability of an otherwise standard search model to reproduce
some of the stylized facts characterizing the U.S. labor market. Airaudo (2010) and
De Graeve et al. (2010) exploit the RT consumers’ assumptions to model asset prices.
Empirical research cannot reject the RT consumer hypothesis. Estimates of struc-
tural equations for consumption growth report a share of RT consumers ranging from
26% to 40% (Campbell and Mankiw 1989, Jacoviello 2004). More recent estimates
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (Coenen and Straub 2005, Forni,
Monteforte, and Sessa 2009) obtain values of approximately 35%. The findings in
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), Shapiro and Slemrod (2009), and Parker et al.
(2011) are also consistent with RT assumptions. Critics of the approach might argue
that the empirical relevance of RT consumer is bound to gradually decline along
with the development of financial markets (Bilbiie, Meier, and Mu¨ller 2008). In fact,
increasing regulation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis (OECD 2009) is likely to
raise the share of liquidity-constrained households in the near future.
The RT consumers hypothesis has triggered a controversy about the properties
that simple and implementable interest rate rules must fulfill in order to guaran-
tee the uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium and to maximize social
welfare. Earlier contributions based on the representative, optimizing agent frame-
work emphasize the importance of satisfying the Taylor principle (Woodford 2003,
Schmitt-Grohe` and Uribe 2004, 2007). In contrast, Bilbiie (2008) shows that in a
world of flexible nominal wages a sufficiently large share of constrained agents
leads to an equilibrium where an interest rate policy based on the Taylor principle
cannot ensure model determinacy. This happens because wage responses to labor
demand changes have a strong impact on profits, causing an inversion of the IS curve.
Colciago (2011) downplays this conclusion; his finding is that wage stickiness limits
the sensitivity of real wages to changes in demand and employment. As a conse-
quence, a mild degree of wage stickiness is sufficient to restore the standard Taylor
principle even for a very large share of RT consumers. In addition, Ascari,
Colciago, and Rossi (2010) find that the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages
is unaffected by the presence of RT consumers and tolerates inflation in order to limit
nominal wage adjustment costs.
This paper proves that—just like wage stickiness undermines the RT consumer
effect outlined in Bilbiie (2008)—consumption habits may restore it. In the modern
New Keynesian business cycle models, consumption habits are relied on to explain
movements in aggregate consumption data and to generate the “hump-shaped” im-
pulse responses widely recognized as characterizing the responses of output and
consumption to demand and supply shocks (see Dennis 2009 and references therein).
We show that habits strengthen the effect of aggregate demand changes on the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor effort, thereby increas-
ing the elasticity of real wages to employment. The combination of consumption
habits and RT households therefore has dramatic implications for model determinacy,
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resurrecting Bilbiie’s inverted Taylor principle for empirically plausible values of the
RT consumers share. In addition, the central bank optimal reaction to inflation is at
least four times stronger than in Ascari, Colciago, and Rossi (2010). To understand
this result consider that, due to consumption habits, output fluctuations generate
important redistributive effects between the two consumer groups in spite of wage
stickiness. As a result, monetary policy is very aggressive on inflation because stabi-
lizing profit margins becomes relatively more important that limiting nominal wage
adjustment costs. In fact the optimal policy now tolerates a substantial amount of
nominal wage volatility.
Demonstrating that RT consumers potentially have important policy implications
when the central bank is the sole policymaker, we then consider the impact of fiscal
rules on the necessary conditions for equilibrium determinacy and on welfare. In
our context, the limited-asset market participation hypothesis paves the way for tax
policies that stabilize the disposable income of RT households.
Research on simple monetary policy rules under limited-asset market participation
has ignored tax policies, with the notable exception of Natvik (2009). In his model,
taxes react to the current output gap and their effect on equilibrium determinacy is
ambiguous. This happens because the strength of the tax feedback is tied to the public
consumption share of GDP, and the scope for model determinacy ultimately depends
on whether government consumption is a complement or a substitute for private con-
sumption, whereas the tax policy plays no autonomous role. We relax the constraint
imposed on the strength of the tax feedback. Even more important, in addition to
the standard feedback on the current output gap, we investigate the performance of
rules that react either to real or to nominal income growth. This choice is related
to the role of habits, which increase the importance of controlling profit gaps and
limiting persistence. All these rules have desirable stabilizing properties, but only
nominal income growth targeting restores the Taylor principle even for economies
characterized by a large share of RT consumers. This happens because control of
output growth limits habit-induced persistence, whereas the contemporaneous feed-
back on inflation generates a complementarity between the monetary and the fiscal
policy rules: both consumer groups now directly react to a contractionary policy stim-
ulus whenever inflation increases and differences in consumption gaps are therefore
reduced.
Finally, we turn to welfare analysis under the assumption that utilities of both
Ricardian and RT households enter the policymaker objective function. Limited
asset market participation requires that macroeconomic policies should control the
differences in consumption gaps between the two households groups, in addition
to the standard concern for stabilizing the output gap and price and nominal wage
inflation rates. Given that RT consumers do not react to interest rate changes, monetary
policy alone does a poor job in achieving this latter objective and fiscal activism
is in principle necessary. In this regard the complementarity between the Taylor
rule and the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth is particularly effective and
produces welfare gains that are unequivocally larger than under the other fiscal
rules.
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Our results concerning tax rules stand in sharp contrast with those obtained in
models based on full asset market participation. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)
argue that optimal fiscal rules should simply ensure debt solvency. Mattesini and
Rossi (2010) show that progressive income taxation introduces a monetary policy
trade-off between inflation stabilization and output stabilization, and that progressive
taxation shrinks the determinacy region when monetary policy implements a Taylor
rule, requiring a stronger response to inflation. A similar conclusion is reached when
effective tax rates are raised by inflation (Edge and Rudd 2007). These contributions
assume complete financial markets and temporary tax adjustments matter only insofar
as they affect the supply side of the economy. Our focus instead is on demand
management policies which become potentially important under limited asset market
participation. In this regard our contribution is related to Hyunseung and Reis (2011)
who model tax/transfer schemes in the context of imperfect credit markets and price
rigidities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce
and describe the New Keynesian model we use in our analysis. In Section 2, there
is an analysis of determinacy and the robustness of the results under alternative
calibrations. In Section 3, the performance on simple optimal monetary and fiscal
rules is investigated. Section 4 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
We consider a cashless New Keynesian DSGE model with consumption habits and
limited asset market participation. Following Galı`, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004,
2007), households are characterized by the same utility function, but a distinction can
be drawn between the fraction θ of RT consumers and the (1 − θ ) Ricardian agents
who have unrestricted access to financial markets. The key difference between the
two groups concerns individual intertemporal consumption optimization, which is
precluded to households who have no access to financial markets.
1.1 Household Preferences
Preferences are defined as follows:














where i : o, r t stands for the household type (Ricardian and RT consumers, re-
spectively), β is the discount factor, Cit represents total individual consumption,
b denotes internal habits, φl > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, and
hit = (
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αw d j) αwαw−1 denotes individual supply of the labor bundle. Cit is a
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The marginal utility of consumption, ˆλit , is2
ˆλit =
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Bt + Ett,t+1 (Qt+1) = Bt−1 + Qt + Pt (Dt − St ) + Wt ht . (4)
In each time period t , they can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal payment
Qt+1 in period t + 1 at the dollar cost Ett,t+1 Qt+1. The variable t,t+1 denotes
the stochastic discount factor between period t and t + 1. Real profits are denoted
by Dt , while Bt is the quantity of nominally riskless bonds purchased in period t at
price R−1t and paying one unit of the consumption numeraire at period t + 1. Pt St
represents nominal lump-sum taxes.
















1 + βb + βb2
1 + b + βb2
)
Et cˆot+1 −
(1 − βb) (1 − b)
1 + b + βb2 (rˆt )
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ , (5)
where rˆt = ˆRt − Et πˆt+1.
RT households. As pointed out above, RT consumers neither save nor borrow; in
each period they entirely consume their labor income net of taxes
cˆr tt = wˆt + ˆht − sˆt . (6)
1. Demand for good z therefore is cit (z) = Cit ( Pt (z)Pt )−η.
2. Hatted variables denote log-deviations from steady state.
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1.2 Labor Market
Each labor market j is monopolistically competitive and there is a union j that
sets the nominal wage, W jt , subject to





ht (z) , (7)
where Wt = (
∫ 1
0 (W jt )1−αw d j)1/(1−αw) is the standard wage index. Each household
i supplies all labor types at the given wage rates3 and the total number of hours











ht d j. (8)
As in Galı`, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007), we assume that the proportion of RT and
Ricardian consumers is uniformly distributed across unions, and demand for each
labor type is uniformly distributed across households. Ricardian and non-Ricardian
households therefore work for the same amount of time, ht . We posit that the represen-
tative union objective function is a weighted average (1 − θ , θ ) of the utility functions
of the two households types, where μw = αw(αw−1) represents the wage markup.
Sticky wages. In each period, a union faces a constant probability (1 − λw) of being
able to reoptimize the nominal wage. Unions that cannot reoptimize simply set their
wages equal to the one in the previous period.





{[ (1 − θ ) ln (Cot+s − bCot+s−1)
+ θ ln (Crtt+s − bCrtt+s−1)
]
− 1








(1 − λw) wˆt − β
λw
(1 − λw) Et πˆt+1
+ λw(1 − λw) πˆt − β
λw
(1 − λw) Et wˆt+1
− λw(1 − λw) wˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎣ (1 − βλw)ϕ ˆht− (1 − βλw)[θ ˆλr tt
+ (1 − θ )ˆλot
]
⎤⎦. (10)
3. The assumption is that wages always remain above the marginal rate of substitution of all house-
holds. Therefore, households are willing to meet the labor demand of firms.
4. It should be noted that the combination of centralized wage setting and wage stickiness introduces
an indirect form of consumption smoothing for RT consumers.
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1.3 Firms
Good z is produced in monopolistically competitive markets with the following
technology
yt (z) = at ht (z),
where at defines a technology process. Firm z’s real marginal costs are:
mct = (1 − ρ) wt
at
, (11)
where wt = WtPt is the real wageand ρ is a production subsidy. We make the assumption
of an efficient steady state in order to study the welfare properties of the economy
without resorting to a second-order approximation to the equations of the model. We
therefore posit that the production subsidy ρ brings production at the competitive
level.5 In log-linear form, production and marginal costs are defined as
yˆt = ˆht + aˆt , (12)
m̂ct = wˆt − aˆt , (13)





Note that profits are the inverse of marginal costs deviations from steady state6
ˆdt = −m̂ct . (14)
Sticky prices. In each period, firm z faces a probability (1 − λp) of being able to
reoptimize its price. All the (1 − λp) firms that reoptimize at time t will face sym-









5. The real wage in the zero-inflation steady state equilibrium is
w = 1(1 − ρ) μp M P L = μw
ψl hφl
[(1 − θ ) λo + θλr t ] ,
where μp = η(η−1) and μw , respectively, define the price and wage markups. Since M P L = 1 must hold
at the efficient steady state, the optimal subsidy is ρ∗ = 1 − 1
μpμw
. Following Ascari, Colciago, and Rossi
(2010), it can be assumed that in each period the subsidy is entirely financed by lump-sum taxes, T , levied
on firms. This, in turn, implies that steady-state firms profits are D = Y − (1 − τ )h WP − T = 0, and both
consumption and the marginal rate of substitution are identical for the two consumer groups.
6. Due to the efficient steady state assumption, profits are defined here as a fraction of steady state
output.
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subject to






where Y dt+s is aggregate demand. Straightforward manipulations allow to obtain the
log-linear Phillips curve
πˆt = (1 − λp)(1 − βλp)
λp
m̂ct + βEt πˆt+1. (16)
1.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
yˆt = cˆt = (1 − θ ) cˆot + θ cˆr tt . (17)
1.5 Policy Rules
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule7
ˆRt = φπ πˆt . (18)
As noted in the introduction, the RT consumer assumption paves the way for fiscal
stabilization policies. To keep complications at a minimum, we neglect cyclical
adjustments of public consumption (as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2007), and assume
that fiscal policy is based on the lump-sum tax, St , which is levied on households.8
The government’s flow budget constraint in log-linear form is given by9
ˆbt = R ˆbt−1 − sˆt , (19)
where R = 1
β
defines the steady state real interest rate. This approach is apparently
similar to Natvik (2009) who assumes that sˆt targets current output deviations from
steady state. He investigates how government size affects equilibrium determinacy
when public consumption enters the households utility function and the scope for
tax policies is restricted because the strength of the fiscal feedback τs is tied to the
exogenous steady-state ratio of public consumption to GDP. In his framework the
determinacy implications of the procyclical tax policy depend on whether public
consumption is a complement or a substitute for private consumption. Our focus is
7. We also experimented with several alternative specifications, such as a forward-looking rule, and
a rule including a feedback on the output gap, but the results were basically unaffected (results available
upon request).
8. It is then straightforward to show that optimizing consumers would not react to cyclical variations
of taxes. We have also controlled for supply side effects of the rule by modeling S as a labor income tax.
Our conclusions are fully confirmed (results available on request).
9. Both sˆ and ˆb are defined as percentages of steady-state output.
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different as we are interested in investigating how different rules affect determinacy
and in identifying the optimal fiscal policy feedbacks associated to such rules.
The fiscal rule is:
sˆt = τs (yˆt − α1 yˆt−1 + α2πˆt ) + τ b ˆbt−1. (20)
Condition (20) encompasses three alternative specifications that we consider in
the paper: (i) when α1 = α2 = 1 fiscal policy controls nominal income growth;
(ii) when α1 = 1, α2 = 0, the fiscal feedback reacts to current output growth; and
(iii) when α1 = α2 = 0 fiscal policy targets the current output deviations from the
steady state. Rule 1, our preferred specification, is consistent with empirical evidence
suggesting that revenues are more sensitive to output growth than to the output gap
and that the real progression of tax rates may be affected by inflation (Auerbach and
Feenberg 2000, Auerbach 2009).10
1.6 Calibration
The technology process is modeled as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). We set
β = (1.03)−0.25, which implies a steady-state annualized real interest rate of about
3%. The parameter φl = 1 is chosen as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
Numerical simulations were φl takes values between 0.2 and 5 confirm our results.
Parameter values for consumption habits, price, and nominal wage stickiness are also
taken from Christiano, Eichenbau, and Evans (λp = 0.6, λw = 0.64), implying that
prices and nominal wages are optimized every 2.5 and 2.8 quarters, respectively.
The relatively high frequency of price adjustments “stakes the cards” against the
indeterminate equilibrium result. The consumption habit parameter, b = 0.7, is taken
from Boldrin et al. (2001).11 Parameters λp, λw, and b play a key role in our model.
The sensitivity of our results to alternative values for these parameters is discussed
in Section 3.1
2. DETERMINACY
Bilbiie (2008) shows that when the labor market is competitive and prices are
sticky, a sufficiently large share of constrained agents leads to an equilibrium where
an interest rate policy based on the Taylor principle cannot ensure model determinacy.
Suppose there is a sunspot increase in output that raises marginal costs and inflation.
When all consumers are Ricardians, the interest rate reaction generates a negative
demand response that is sufficient to rule out the initial output increase as a possible
10. To ensure stability of the debt accumulation process the fiscal rule includes a feedback on ˆbt−1. In
our simulations, coefficient τ b takes the value 0.02. For a detailed discussion on the stabilizing properties
of τ b in a model with LAMP, see Rossi (Forthcoming).
11. Parameter calibrations are reported in Table 1.
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equilibrium. By contrast a relatively large share of RT consumers, coupled with the
flexible wage response to increased labor demand, has a strong impact on profits and
causes an inverse relationship between cˆot and wˆt .12 Using (12), (17), and (14) it is
easy to see that in equilibrium each optimizing household must consume
cˆot = wˆt + ˆht +
ˆdt
1 − θ = yˆt −
θwˆt
1 − θ . (21)
The policy-induced fall in cˆot is therefore consistent with the sunspot increase in
output, and the increase in output is validated by the expansion of RT consumption.
In this case an inverted Taylor principle (φπ < 1) is required to restore determinacy.
Colciago (2011) shows that a mild degree of wage stickiness is sufficient to dampen
the Keynesian multiplier effect generated by RT consumers on real wages, restoring
the standard Taylor principle even for large values of θ .
Without consumption habits, that is, when we set b = 0, our model replicates
Colciago’s result even if fiscal policy is switched off. By contrast, under our calibration
of b, determinacy requires an inversion of the Taylor principle when θ > 0.42 and
fiscal policy is inactive (Figure 1). Note that habits raise the sensitivity of wages to
employment. In fact, substituting (3), (12), and (17) into (10) we obtain the elasticity
of wages with respect to worked hours13
∂wˆt
∂ ˆht
= (1 − λw) (1 − βλw)(
1 + βλ2w
) [φl + (1 + βb2)(1 − βb) (1 − b)
]
. (22)
It is easy to see that habits have a powerful impact on ∂wˆt
∂ ˆht
, which compensates the
dampening role of the nominal wage stickiness parameter λw. This effect would not
matter for determinacy in standard models based on the representative Ricardian
agent (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2007), but
it is quite important here, because it strengthens the income redistribution between
the two consumers groups.
Note that habits also weaken the Ricardian agents response to interest rate changes.
If we remove the effect of habits from the Euler equation (5) and maintain it in the wage
setting equation an inversion of the Taylor principle is required when θ > 0.46. By
contrast, if we remove the effect of habits from the wage-setting equation determinacy
obtains under the Taylor principle unless θ > 0.98. The basic message of this section
therefore is that habit persistence should always be taken into account for determinacy
analysis of models that account for limited asset market participation.
12. To grasp intuition one should bear in mind that due to price stickiness, firms profits are the inverse
of real marginal costs deviations from steady state.
13. Given lagged variables and the expectations about the future.




















FIG. 1. Threshold Share of RT Households, θ∗, as a Function of Consumption Habits, b, and Wage Stickiness, λw.
2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The threshold value θ∗ that triggers an inversion of the Taylor principle is crucially
affected by three key parameters: the degrees of price and nominal wage stickiness,
respectively, λp and λw, and consumption habits, b. Empirical DSGE models yield
different estimates for these parameters. Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2008) obtain a relatively large habit parameter (b = 0.88) and find that prices and
nominal wages are reoptimized every 11 and 1.8 quarters, respectively. With these
parameter values, a low share of RT consumers (θ = 0.04) is sufficient to require an
inversion of the Taylor principle. An almost identical result is obtained if we follow
Guerron-Quintana (2010) who estimates an even stronger degree of habit formation
(b = 0.91), but finds that prices and nominal wages are reoptimized every 5.5 and
2.6 quarters, respectively. By contrast, in Smets and Wouters (2003) b = 0.71 and
prices and wages are reoptimized every 3 and 3.3 quarters, respectively. In this case,
the inversion of the Taylor principle is obtained at θ = 0.5.14 Given our benchmark
calibration of b, Figure 1 shows that wage stickiness overturns consumption habits
effects when either b is far below existing estimates or when nominal wages are
implausibly rigid.
2.2 The Fiscal Rules and the Taylor Principle
Rule 1 has substantial implications for dynamic stability (Figure 2). For instance,
the Taylor principle holds irrespective of the size of θ when τs = 0.55. Figure 2 also
14. These estimated models allow for price and wage indexation to past inflation. Introducing inflation
indexation in our model has no effect on the threshold for the value of θ that causes inversion of the Taylor
principle. Results available upon request.
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τs on output gap
τs on real output growth
τs on nominal output growth
FIG. 2. Threshold Share of RT Households, θ∗ as a Function of the Tax Coefficient τs .
shows that the fiscal policy effects would be weaker if, instead of reacting to nominal
income growth, the tax feedback targeted either real output growth or the current
output deviation from steady state, yˆt .




y1yˆt−1 + y2 Etyˆt+1 − y3 Etyˆt+2 − y4
(




− (wˆt−1 − τsα2πˆt−1) + y5 (wˆt − τsα2πˆt )
− y6 Et (wˆt+1 − τsα2πˆt+1)
+ bβEt (wˆt+2 − τsα2πˆt+2)




where y0 = b − θ [b − τs(b + 1 + βb2α1)]; y1 = bα1τs ; y2 = 1 + βb2 − θ [1 +
βb2(1 − τs) − bα1βτs]; y3 = bβ[1 − θ (1 − τs)]; y4 = (1 − βb)(1 − b); y5 = (b +
1 + βb2); y6 = b(β + 1 + βb2); y7 = 1 + βb2.
Consider rule 3 (α1 = α2 = 0). It is easy to see that the tax response to the current
output gap strengthens the sensitivity of current output growth to the real interest
rate. In addition, the impact of current and expected RT consumption decisions on
yˆt is unambiguously falling in the fiscal policy parameter τs .
It is interesting to compare this result with Natvik (2009), when households utility is
separable in consumption of public and private goods. He finds that the threshold value
θ associated to indeterminacy is a nonmonotonic concave function of τs , reaching
a maximum when τs  10%. This result is easily understood bearing in mind that




b 0.7 Degree of habit persistence
β (1.03)−0.25 Subjective discount factor
λp 0.6 Price stickiness
λw 0.64 Wage stickiness
φl 1 Inverse of Frisch elasticity
ρa 0.855 Persistence of technology process
σε 0.0064 Shock std. deviation
in his model τs also defines the size of the government-to-GDP ratio. In this case,
a change in τs has a twofold effect. On the one hand the variation in government
size raises the sensitivity of gross wages (and gross income) to sunspot shocks. On
the other hand, the stronger procyclical fiscal feedback dampens the volatility of RT
consumption and weakens the correlation between gross and net labor income.
Turning to rule 2 (α1 = 1, α2 = 0), it is easy to see that the desirable effects of
procyclical taxation are enhanced when the fiscal rule targets output growth instead
of the current output deviation from steady state. In this regard it would be straightfor-
ward to show that the stabilizing effect of targeting output growth instead of yˆt arises
in so far as b = 0. Finally, control of nominal income growth (α1 = α2 = 1) adds
a fiscal feedback on inflation that dampens effect of real wage changes on demand.
This happens because a real wage variation causes a change in marginal costs and
inflation. The fiscal response to inflation impacts on RT consumption and weakens
the link between wˆt and yˆt and is quite effective in ensuring that determinacy obtains
when monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. Fiscal control of nominal income
growth therefore strengthens the complementarity between the monetary and the fis-
cal policy rules since both consumer groups now directly react to a contractionary
policy stimulus whenever inflation increases.
2.3 Model Fit to Business Cycle Statistics
The combination of consumption habits and RT households is crucial for our
theoretical results concerning determinacy. Are these two “frictions” also important
to fit business cycle statistics? To answer this question one must close the model by
choosing plausible parameters for the monetary and fiscal policy rules. Our model
is calibrated to the U.S. economy (see Table 1), we therefore select policy parameters
which are consistent with monetary and fiscal reaction functions estimated for this
economy. The monetary policy feedback, φπ = 1.5, is in line with the estimates
obtained in Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1998). As for the fiscal rule, we focus on the
rule that targets the current output deviation from steady state (α1 = α2 = 0) and set
τs = 0.25, in order to match the U.S. budgetary response to the output gap estimated
in van den Noord (2000).
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TABLE 2
MODEL’S FIT
Data θ = 0, τs = 0 θ = 0.4, τs = 0 θ = 0.4, τs = 0.25
yˆ 1.36 0.1890 5.0598 1.0179
π 0.72 0.3327 1.1615 0.6806
ˆh 3.11 0.5101 3.5135 1.3034
ˆR 0.72 0.4990 1.7422 1.0209
Note: Values represent percentage standard deviations.
As showed in Table 2, the representative agent model underestimates the second
moments of inflation, hours, and nominal interest rate we found in the data.15 By
contrast, simulated volatility is too high when we include RT consumers and fiscal
policy is switched off. Finally, model fit substantially improves when fiscal policy is
activated.
3. OPTIMAL SIMPLE MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY RULES
This paper now turns to the analysis of the optimal simple policy rules, subject
to the determinacy constraints of the model. The first step in our analysis is the
identification of the solution to the social planner problem.
3.1 The Social Planner Problem
































θCrtt + (1 − θ ) Cot = Ct ,
θhrtt + (1 − θ ) hot = ht ,
Yt = Ct ,
15. We take the values for detrended percentage standard deviations in the data from Galı` and Rabanal
(2004). The standard deviations we compute for our model are detrended (through HP filter) in order to
make them comparable with the ones extracted from the time series.
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Yt = at ht .
By assumption, the two household groups have symmetrical preferences, but RT
consumers have no access to financial markets. As a result, from the social planner
perspective both consumption and worked hours should be identical for the two
groups. In addition, the social planner faces an intertemporal problem due to internal
habit formation, which affects socially optimal dynamics in response to shocks. It
is easy to demonstrate that the log-linear solutions to the social planner problem,
that is, the socially optimal deviations from steady state, are (cˆot )∗ = (cˆr tt )∗ = (cˆt )∗ =
(yˆt )∗, ( ˆhot )∗ = ( ˆhrtt )∗, wˆ∗t = aˆt , and(
φl + (1 + βb
2)
(1 − βb)(1 − b)
)
yˆ∗t




(1 − βb) (1 − b) yˆ
∗
t−1 + (φl + 1) aˆt . (24)
Given (24), it would be straightforward to show that consumption habits cause an
“hump-shaped” socially optimal output response to shocks.
3.2 The Policymaker’s Welfare Function
Following Bilbiie (2008) and Ascari, Colciago, and Rossi (2010), the policymaker’s
period objective function assigns weights θ , (1 − θ ) to utilities of the two households
groups
Wt =
{[(1 − θ ) ln (Cot − bCot−1)+ θ ln (Crtt − bCrtt−1)]− ψl1 + φl (ht )1+φl
}
. (25)
We derive the second-order approximation16 to (25) around the efficient steady
state, and then re-express it as deviations from the solutions to the social planner
problem, obtaining the discounted value of the central bank loss function: 17









⎡⎣ θ (xˆr tt+s − xˆ∗t+s)2
+ (1 − θ ) (xˆ ot+s − xˆ∗t+s)2
⎤⎦









+ t i p + O(||ξ ||3),
(26)
16. Here we follow Benigno and Woodford (2003).
17. The derivation of (26) strictly follows Ascari, Colciago, and Rossi (2010) and Leith, Moldovan,
and Rossi (2012). Detailed derivation is available upon request.
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where xˆ∗t+s = 1(1−b) yˆ∗t+s − b(1−b) yˆ∗t+s−1, xˆ it+s = 1(1−b) cˆit+s − b(1 − b)cˆit+s−1, κp =(1−λp)(1−βλp)
λp




xˆr tt+s − xˆ∗t+s
)2 + (1 − θ ) (xˆ ot+s − xˆ∗t+s)2 ]
= (xˆ ot+s − xˆ∗t+s)2 + θ[ (xˆr tt+s − xˆ ot+s)2 + (xˆr tt+s − xˆ ot+s) (xˆ ot+s − xˆ∗t+s) ]. (27)
The policymaker is therefore concerned with the differences in consumption utility,
(xˆr tt+s − xˆ ot+s), between the two consumer groups. These are determined by firm profits
and may arise only to the extent that marginal costs gaps are tolerated.
3.3 Monetary Policy without Fiscal Stabilization
The optimization problem consists in deriving the strength of the policy parameter
φπ , which minimizes (26) subject to the behavior of households, wage setters and
firms in response to a technology shock. As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004, 2007)
who arbitrarily limit the attention to policy coefficients in the interval [−3,3],18 we
restrict the admissible range of φπ , but we allow for the interval [−10,10] in order to
enhance the differences of our results with theirs. Our results are obtained using the
parameter values presented in Table 1.19
Consider first a situation where all agents are Ricardians, wages are flexible, and
there are no consumption habits. In this case the policymaker is only concerned with
stabilization of profit margins at the efficient steady state value and monetary policy
is aggressive, (φ∗π (θ = b = λw = 0) = 10). When wages are sticky the strength of
the inflation coefficient in (18) falls dramatically, φ∗π (θ = b = 0, λw = 0.64) = 2.4.
This happens because optimal policy now tolerates inflation in order to limit wage
adjustment costs (see Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust 2006). At this stage, introducing
RT consumers has a minor impact on the optimal rule: 2.4 < φ∗π (λw = 0.64, 0 <
θ < 0.42, b = 0) ≤ 2.8. Similarly, the policy rule does not change much when habit
frictions are introduced but RT consumers are absent, φ∗π (λw = 0.64, θ = 0, b =
0.7) = 3.9. By contrast, the combination of habits and RT consumers requires a larger
φ∗π , which rapidly grows with θ (Figure 3). In fact, habits increase the sensitivity
of real wages to current employment levels (see (22)) and an increasing share or
RT households strengthens the redistributive effects of wage changes between the
two consumer groups (cˆot+s − cˆr tt+s =
ˆdt+s
1−θ = − wˆt+s1−θ ). Given (27), the policymaker’s
concern with such differences also increases with θ . As a result, the anti-inflation
18. This choice is justified by the idea that rules characterized by stronger interest rate reaction to
changes in inflation are difficult to communicate to the public and therefore unlikely to be implemented
in practice (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2007).
19. Optimal policy coefficients are obtained numerically, following Soderlind (1999). Optimal coef-
ficients in the monetary rule are the result of a grid search in the interval [−10,10] with step 0.1. Optimal
fiscal coefficients are searched in the interval (0,1) with step 0.01.
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FIG. 3. Optimal Interest Rate Response to Inflation as Function of the Share of RT Households.




















































FIG. 4. Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Producticity Shock (Percentage Deviations from Steady State).
policy is more aggressive because stabilizing profit margins becomes relatively more
important that limiting nominal wage adjustment costs.
Figure 4 displays impulse response functions (IRFs henceforth) to a positive tech-
nology shock that obtain under φ∗π (λw = 0.64, θ = 0, b = 0.7) = 3.9 (blue lines) and
φ∗π (λw = 0.64, θ = 0.3, b = 0.7) = 10 (green dotted lines). Due to the sluggish price
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE STANDARD DEVIATIONS UNDER THE OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
yˆ π ˆh ˆR wˆ rˆ cˆo cˆr t πw ˆd
θ = 0 0.49 0.173 0.417 0.677 0.5740 0.589 0.49 − 0.188 0.321
θ = 0.3 0.519 0.157 0.486 1.574 0.6017 1.535 0.573 0.638 0.25 0.438
Note: Values represent percentage standard deviations.
TABLE 4
OPTIMAL POLICY PARAMETERS
θ = 0.25 θ = 0.3 θ = 0.4
τ∗s φ∗π G∗ τ∗s φ∗π G∗ τ∗s φ∗π G∗
Rule 1 0.45 5.7 0.16 0.57 6 0.4 0.74 6.7 0.97
Rule 2 0.99 10 0.09 0.99 10 0.20 0.99 10 0.94
Rule 3 0.99 8.8 0.10 0.99 10 0.29 0.99 10 0.95
Note: G∗ represents the percentage welfare gain with respect to the case of no fiscal stabilization
adjustment mechanism, output initially increases and worked hours fall irrespective
of the value imposed on θ . This is in line with the empirical findings of Galı` (1999),
Basu, Fernald, and Kimballet (2006), and Canova, Lo´pez-Salido, and Michelacci
(2010). Monetary policy cannot avoid substantial consumption differences between
the two consumer groups when θ = 0.3. Optimizing consumers increase demand
because expected future consumption grows and because the real interest rate falls.
In contrast, RT consumer demand is constrained by current labor income. However,
for both groups actual consumption is equal to current income because there is no
capital in the model. The surge in profits therefore explains why optimizing house-
holds can increase their consumption. Table 3 shows that when θ = 0.3 the strong
policy feedback manages to limit inflation volatility but cannot avoid an increase in
volatility for all the remaining variables, and mainly for nominal wage inflation, πˆw,
and profits.
3.4 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Rules
In this case coefficients φ∗π and τ ∗s are chosen to minimize (26) conditional
to the fact that the fiscal rule alternatively controls nominal income growth
(rule 1, α1 = α2 = 1), real income growth (rule 2, α1 = 1, α2 = 0), and the current
output gap (rule 3, α1 = α2 = 0). All the fiscal rules reduce welfare losses relative
to the benchmark regime where τs = 0, the obtained welfare gains increase in θ ,
and L(α1 = α2 = 1) < L(α1 = α2 = 0) < L(α1 = 1, α2 = 0) (Table 4). Under rules
2 and 3 coefficients φ∗π and τ ∗s reach the maximum admissible values, whereas
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE STANDARD DEVIATIONS UNDER THE OPTIMAL POLICY
No fiscal policy Fiscal rule 3 Fiscal rule 2 Fiscal rule 1
yˆ 0.5189 0.5042 0.4867 0.4957
π 0.1574 0.1619 0.1910 0.1651
ˆh 0.4862 0.4600 0.5226 0.4427
ˆR 1.5741 1.6188 1.9097 0.9905
wˆ 0.6017 0.5847 0.5598 0.5758
rˆ 1.5347 1.5623 1.8454 0.9223
cˆo 0.5726 0.7840 0.6034 0.5175
cˆr t 0.6377 0.4066 0.7574 0.4927
πw 0.2498 0.1830 0.1644 0.1604
sˆ − 0.5133 0.2250 0.1858
ˆd 0.4381 0.3922 0.4707 0.3608
Note: Values represent percentage standard deviations under benchmark calibration and θ = 0.3
control of nominal income growth is associated to lower policy parameters for both
monetary and fiscal policy. The lower values observed for φ∗π and τ ∗s under rule 1 are
easily understood taking into account the complementarity between monetary and
fiscal policy that obtains when this rule is implemented (see (23)). Table 5 shows
that control of nominal income growth obtains a substantial reduction in the volatil-
ity of profits, wage inflation, and Ricardian households consumption. This comes
at the cost of a minor increase in inflation volatility. In addition, under this rule we
observe a dramatic fall of RT consumption volatility, which is now identical to the
one observed for Ricardian agents. Rule 3 has similar effects with the notable excep-
tion of Ricardian agents’ consumption volatility, that increases dramatically. Rule 2
dampens the volatility of output and the real wage, but has adverse effects on the
remaining variables. In Figure 5(a) we plot the IRFs under different the fiscal rules. It
is interesting to note that the three fiscal rules have different effects on consumption
dynamics of the two consumers groups. Under rules 2 and 3 the tax burden increases,
inducing a fall in RT consumption relative to the case of no fiscal policy action.20
This, in turn, limits wage dynamics and dampens marginal costs. The beneficial effect
of taxes on profits strengthens the initial increase in the consumption of optimizing
households. The reduction in aggregate consumption volatility associated to these
rules is therefore due to a composition effect. Rule 1, which reacts to the inflation
fall, works quite differently. In fact the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth
delivers the tax reduction necessary to raise consumption of RT agents in response to
the productivity increase. The relative merits of rule 1 are apparent from the analysis
of Figure 5(b), where variables are defined as gaps from socially optimal deviations
from steady state.
20. In this regard, rule based on feedback on yˆt is particularly penalizing for RT consumers.
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FIG. 5. (a) Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Producticity Shock (percentage deviation from the steady state);
(b) Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Producticity Shock (gaps from socially optimal deviation from steady state).
4. CONCLUSION
The key message is that limited asset market participation has potentially strong
policy implications when the central bank is the sole policymaker, but a well-crafted
system of automatic fiscal stabilizers dampens the undesirable effects of limited asset
market participation.
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The fiscal rules we consider are akin to the so-called automatic stabilizers, that
is, those elements of fiscal policy that react to the business cycle without requiring
discretionary fiscal policy action. Automatic stabilizers characterize modern market
economies and their working is typically associated to a reduction in the volatility of
output and consumption (Fatas and Mihov 2001, 2010, Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2010,
Debrun, Pisani-Ferry, and Sapir 2008, Debrun and Kapoor 2010). Our contribution
provides a theoretical background to the policy-oriented literature that sees automatic
stabilizers as an important component of the future macroeconomic policy framework
(Baunsgaard and Symansky 2009, Blanchard et al. 2010).
Our results also sound a note of caution, suggesting that fiscal rules should be
carefully designed. We emphasize the desirability of linking taxes to inflation and
to income growth in order to restore the Taylor principle and to limit differences
in consumption gaps between the two households groups. This conclusion supports
Auerbach’s (2009) statement that the U.S. policy of introducing full inflation in-
dexation of the individual income tax—as well as the reduction in marginal tax
rates—is likely to have complicated the task of monetary policy in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis, eventually forcing the government to implement a strongly
discretionary fiscal action.
Further research should investigate the optimal design of automatic stabilizers
in medium-scale models, accounting for both a richer set of tax instruments and
counter-cyclical public consumption expenditure.
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